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latter case reaches a distorted and highly undesirable result; for the second
wife, knowing neither of the previous marriage nor subsequent divorce,
could not have contracted a meretricious marriage. Teter v. Teter,23 a
previous case had reached the opposite result than that in the Benham
case, and under practically identical circumstances, did raise the presump-
tion of a common law marriage.
It would seem then, that the law in Indiana is that where one of the
parties to an ostensible marriage is insane at the time of such ostensible
marriage, no marital relationship is created, but that it is absolutely
void ab initio.24 The marriage of two parties, one of whom has been
previously married and is undivorced and the first spouse is still living
at the time of the second marriage, is also absolutely void. 25 In either
iristance such relationship may be attacked by anyone, at any time, in
any proceeding before any court. But, in the former instance, where a
party is once adjudged insane by a proper tribunal, although such party
is presumed to continue to be insane thereafter, in the absence of an aver-
ment and proof that the party was insane at the time of the marriage,
the law will presume the party to have recovered his sanity and that a
valid marriage was created. 26 Where there is an averment and proof
that one of the parties was insane at the time of the marriage, but no
averment that the incapacitated party thereafter continued to be insane,
and where the parties continue thereafter to cohabit for pure motives
and by their conduct are generally known as husband and wife, the law
will presume a good common law marriage between the parties. 27 And
in the latter instance, in the absence of any averment and proof that a
divorce had not been secured prior to the second marriage, the law will
presume that such divorce had been secured, and that the marriage was
legal.28 Where it is shown that a divorce was in fact not granted before
the second marriage, the second marriage being therefore void, but a
divorce was granted to the incapacitated spouse subsequent to the second
marriage, and the parties afterward cohabit in good faith, and by their
conduct are known as husband and wife, the law will presume a good
common law marriage.2 9  I. D. P.
INJUNTION-EXERCISE OF DiscRETioNARY POwER GRANTED TO ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE BoARD.-In order to contract for the transportation of school
children in the Washington school township of Daviess county for the
school years 1931-32, 1932-33, 1933-34, 1934-35, the county trustee pro-
ceeded under chapter No. 59 of the Acts of 1931, page 144. Ray Browning
submitted a bid of $3.00 per day, proposing to use a 1927 model Chevrolet
truck. Erve Padgett submitted a bid of $3.40 per day, proposing to use
a 1928 model Chevrolet truck. William Small submitted a $4.00 per day
23Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129, 51 Ami. Rep. 752.
24 Wiley V. Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252; Teter v. Teter (1885),
101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742.
2 Compton v. Benham (1909), 44 Ind. App. 51.
26'astor v. Davis (1889), 120 Ind. 231.
2 Wiley v. 'Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252; Langdon v. Langdon
(principal case), 123 N. E. 400.
2Boulden v. McIntire (1889), 119 Ind. 574, 21 N. E. 445.
'Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742.
RECENT CASE NOTES
bid. At 8 o'clock P. M. on the third Tuesday of July, 1931, the advisory
board of the township met with the trustee and opened, tabulated, con-
sidered and discussed the bids and awarded the contract to Erve Padgett.
In a suit filed by appellee against the trustee, the members of the advisory
board, and the successful bidder, it was alleged that the contract had
been awarded "capriciously, arbitrarily, and in bad faith and unlawfully"
and prayed that the contract be set aside, a restraining order issued
prohibiting proceeding under the contract, and a mandate ordering a
contract with the appellee. The trial court held the contract arbitrary,
illegal and void, perpetually enjoined appellants from proceeding under it,
and mandated the trustee to award the contract to the appellee. Appel-
lant's motion to modify the judgment by striking out the mandate was
overruled. Appellant moved for a new trial on the grounds that the
finding was not sustained by sufficient evidence and that the finding was
contrary to law. The rulings on both these motions was assigned as error
and an appeal was taken. Held, reversed with instructions to enter a
judgment for the appellant.'
Section 2, chapter 56 of the Acts of 1931 provides that the township
trustee and the advisory board shall open the bids and "shall award the
contract * * * to the lowest or best responsible bidder". The appel-
late Court of Indiana said: "Thus we come to a necessity for an inter-
pretation of 'lowest or best responsible bidder' ". A statute so worded
would, it would seem, leave very little room for a misinterpretation. The
amount of the bid is not intended to be controlling. And correctly so.
It is reasonable to believe that a bid might be so low as to indicate in
itself a lack of responsibility. It was no doubt the intent of the legislature
to prevent such a person obtaining a contract for the transportation of
school children. Therefore the phrase is added "or best responsible
bidder". The trustee and the advisory board were given the use of their
discretion and judgment-awarding such a contract is not purely a minis-
terial act. It has often been held that such a discretionary power is
granted by the use of the term "responsible bidder".2
To further show this intent the trustee and the advisory board were
given the power to "reject any and all bids" if no "satisfactory" bid was
received.
In the exercise of the discretion granted in the statute, what were
proper elements to be taken into consideration The term "responsible"
means not only pecuniary ability but includes many other elements that
may be considered. 3 The Appellate Court correctly stated the law to be
that ability and capacity,4 capital,5 character and reputation,6 competency
'Lee v. Browning, Appellate Court of Indiana, October 5, 1932, 182 N. E. 550.
2Ross v. Stackhouse (1887), 114 Ind. 200, 16 N. El. 501; Boyd v. Murphy
(1890), 127 Ind. 174, 25 N. E. 702; Bloomington v. Phelps (1897), 149 Ind. 596, 49
N. E. 581; Lane v'. Boone County (1893). 7 Ind. App. 625, 35 N. E. 28.
3 59 C. J. 177, 178, cases cited.
4 Inge v. Bd. of Public Works (1903), 135 Ala. 187, 33 So. 678; Kelly v. Chicago
(1871), 62 Iii. 279; Maryland Paving Co. v. Mahoal (1909), 110 Md. 397, 72 AtI.
833; State ex tel. Eaves v. Richard. (1895), 16 Mont. 145, 40 Pac. 210.
Gilmore v. Utica (1892), 131 W. Y. 26, 29 N. E. 841.
6 Un ted States Wood Preserving Co. v. Sundmaker (1911), 185 Fed. 678, 110
C. C. A. 224.
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and efficiency,7 energy,8 experience,9 facilities,' 0 faithfulness and fidelity,"1
fraud or unfairness in previous conduct,' 2 honesty,1. integrity,14 prompt-
ness,15 suitability to a particular task,16 reliability and trustworthiness,' 7
and quality of previous workl8 were elements considerable. In considering
the bids involved in the instant case the trustee and advisory board con-
cerned themselves with the facilities ability, and financial condition of the
bidders. As the Appellate Court points out, other considerations may have
entered into the mental calculations of the trustee and the board. But
no indication is made that any improper element was considered.
Here the award was made to one not the lowest bidder and therefore
the trustee and the advisory board must have made the award to the
person who was in their judgment the best responsible bidder. It is obvious
that the discretion granted by the legislature was exercised by this body
in making the award. May the court then substitute its judgment for
the judgment and discretion granted to a particular body by the legislature?
No fraud was shown here in the action of the trustee and advisory board
in making the award of the contract and in the absence of fraud or an
abuse of their discretion amounting to fraud, the court may not interfere.19
To do this would be to substitute the judgment of the court for the judg-
ment of the body in which the legislature placed such discretion and in
effect nullify the discretionary power granted to any such body. There
is no ground therefore for the granting of injunction or mandamus 20
and the judgment was properly reversed in favor of the appellants.
J. S. H.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CASUAL EMPLOY-
MENTs.-The appellant was employed in helping the appellee tear down
a barn on the land occupied by the appellee as tenant. The appellant had
never worked for the appellee before that day. The appellant had been
a sheet metal worker until physical incapacities forced him out of that
employment. For three years preceding the accident he had performed
odd jobs, and within the last year he was not employed in any labor.
7 Renting v. Titusville (1896), 175 Pa. 512, 34 At. 916.
sKelly v. Chicago (1871), 62 Ill. 279.
'Relly v. Chicago (1871), 62 Ill. 279; Gilmore v. Utica (1892), 131 N. Y. 26,
29 N. El. 841; Renting v. Titusville (1896), 175 Pa. 512, 34 Atl. 916.
10 Gilmore v. Utica (1892), 131 N. Y. 26, 29 N. E. 841.
"McClain v. McKiason (1896), 54 Ohio St. 673, 47 N. E. 1114.
"Jacobson v. Bd. of Education, (1906), (Vt.), 64 At. 609.
13 -Wells v. School Dist. (1868), 41 Vt. 353.
14 I-nge v. Bd. of Public Works (1903), 135 Ala. 187, 33 So. 678.
15 Renting v. Titusville (1896), 175 Pa. 512, 34 At. 916; McClain v. MoKisson
(1896), 54 Ohio St. 673, 47 N. E. 1114.
1 Stuewe v. Hudson (1912), 44 Mont. 429, 120 Pac. 485.1TKelly v. Chicago (1871), 62 IlL 275; Denver v. Dumars (1904), 33 Colo. 94,
80 Pac. 114.
sBarber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Trenton (1907), 74 N. J. L. 430, 65 Atl. 873.
1 0 Kitchel v. Ed. of Commissioners of Union County (1889), 123 Ind. 540, 24
N. E. 366; Kraus v. Lebman (1907), 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714; Windle v. City of
Valparaiso (1916), 62 Ind. App. 342, 113 N. B. 429; Lincoln School Township -v.
Union Trust Co. of Indianapolis (1905), 36 Ind. App. 113, 73 N. Sb. 623.
2 Seward v. The Town of Liberty (1895), 142 Ind. 551, 42 X. E. 39; Hitchel v.
Ed. of Commissioners of Union County (1889), 123 lad. 540, 24 N. El. 366; Windle
v. City of Valparaiso (1916), 62 lad. App. 342, 113 N. E. 429; Rd. of Commissioners
of Newton County v. State ex rel. Bringham (1903), 161 Ind. 616, 69 N. E. 442.
